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Abstract  
This paper analyzes the impacts of local emissions charges as well as a tax on CO2 for a 
small open economy. We do this to see the separate and collective impacts of these 
taxes so as to understand the effects of a system of environmental taxes that reflects 
something close to the full internalization of external effects in the case of air 
emissions. The analysis was carried out using a static CGE model, with unemployment, 
bottom-up abatement technologies and with sector- and fuel-specific emission 
coefficients.  The model imposes environmental charges on several pollutants, as a 
result of which emissions can fall through three channels: reduced output of the 
polluting good, substitution between production factors, and increased end-of-pipe 
abatement activity.  Such CGE modeling of both local and global pollutants, with a wide 
range of abatement options is one of the first of its kind.  The analysis shows that a full 
internalization of air pollution externalities can result in modest overall welfare gains 
and the combination of local pollution taxes and CO2 taxes should be feasible.  There 
are, however, differences in terms of employment and output impacts, depending on 
what combination of taxes are applied, which sectors are covered and how fiscal 
revenues are redistributed. 
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1. Introduction 
 
This paper brings together three important themes in the economics literature and in 
the public policy debate: the ancillary benefits (also referred to as co-benefits) of 
climate policy, the concept of externalities, and the use of environmental taxes to 
address both environmental and economic problems (sometimes referred to as the 
double dividend).   
 
On the first, it is well known that climate change mitigation measures which result in 
reducing greenhouse gas emissions may also reduce emissions of other air pollutants, 
and as a result, improve air quality; conversely air quality improvement measures could 
also generate reductions in GHG emissions. Such multi-pollutant effects of policy has 
been measured in physical units to derive co-effects (for instance, Meyer et al. 1998) or 
in monetary terms to derive co-benefits (as, for instance, in Burtraw et al. 2003). The 
co-benefits have been quantified with (a) a linear programming partial equilibrium 
framework linked either to a macro economic model (Grossman et al. 2011) or to 
impact assessment modelling (e.g., Burtraw et al. 2003; Van Vuuren et al. 2006; Krook 
Riekkola et al. 2011; Rečka and Ščasný 2013), or (b) by use of a general equilibrium 
framework (e.g., Glomsrød et al. 1992; Scheraga and Leary 1993; the EPPA5 model 
developed within the MIT Joint Joint Program on the Science and Policy of Global 
Change, see Paltsev et al. 2005). For example, in a study for the EU, using a partial 
equilibrium energy model GAINS, Holland et al. (2011)  estimate that the 2˚C 
stabilization scenario would also reduce SO2 emissions by 60%, NOx by 46% and 
particulate matter by 19%.  These reductions would lead to large health improvements 
and important co-benefits for ecosystems. The air quality co-benefits correspond to 
€43 billion per year by 2050 in the EU27 or around €24 for each ton of CO2 reduced. 
Similar but less strong results are obtained by Markandya et al. (2009) for the EU, who 
show, however, much greater co-benefits benefits in fast growing countries such as 
China and India.  These numbers demonstrate that the monetized co-benefits are very 
relevant to the policy discussion and need to be taken into account in determining the 
level of mitigation as well as the design of mitigation options.  As pointed out by 
Burtraw et al. (2003), inadequately considered ancillary benefits could lead to an 
incorrect assessment of the net costs of mitigation policies and an incorrect 
identification of ‘no regrets’ levels of GHG mitigation, and, as a consequence, choosing 
a policy that would be unnecessarily expensive because of its failure to fully exploit 
potential ancillary benefits. For instance, Nam et al. (2013), by using the EPPA5 model, 
found that if China achieves its SO2 and NOx emission reduction targets, as proposed in 
its 12 Five Year Plan, the corresponding carbon-mitigation potential exceeds China’s 
official 17% CO2 intensity reduction goal. 
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On the top of these co-benefits, GHG mitigation policies would also reduce the need to 
implement air quality regulation for other pollutants and thus avoid additional 
regulatory costs. To summarize, the existence of such benefits emphasizes the 
importance of exploiting synergies in the field of air pollution and climate change 
policies. 
 
While the literature on ancillary benefits has grown immensely during past ten-twenty 
years, studies dealing with developing and transforming economies are relatively few 
(Morgenstern 2000).  In the case of economies in transition we have Aaheim et al. 
(1997) and Aunan et al. (2000) who investigated the ancillary benefits of energy saving 
in Hungary. Ščasný et al. (2009) and Rečka and Ščasný (2013) examined the effect on 
and benefits due to both carbon emission and local air pollutants in the Czech Republic 
by a macro-econometric model and a linear optimization energy model, respectively, 
but neither one has paid a special attention to the ancillary benefits. Dudek et al. 
(2003) and Markandya et al. (2003) provide an analysis of ancillary benefits for Russia. 
 
The present paper is thus the first of its kind that question benefits of various policies 
on both carbon and local air pollutants using a standard modeling framework in a 
former transition economy, namely the Czech Republic. 
 
On the externalities question, we also have a significant literature providing estimates 
of the quantitative importance of various external effects, such as emissions of key air 
pollutants.  Yet governments have been reticent to impose charges on polluters at 
levels equal to the external costs, largely because they fear the disruptive negative 
effect on economy. As a result, the degree of internalization of the externalities of 
energy generation associated with air pollutants is very low.  This holds even if the 
internalization estimate includes not only the air emission charges and any energy 
taxes but also the cross-subsidy for renewable energy (see Máca et al. 2012, Bye and 
Holmoy 2010).  Moreover, due to the over-allocation of EU allowances for CO2 
emissions covering the 2005-2012 period, the externality related to climate change has 
not been internalized at all.  
 
In addition to setting the prices right, the concept of externalities also allows us to 
express a wide range of physical co-effects in monetary terms and thus directly 
compare these effects with the economic costs involved.  Given the importance of this 
issue it is surprising that no one has checked what impacts a full internalization of 
external costs of air pollution would have on the economy. This is part of the reason for 
this study. 
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On the double dividend debate there is now a formidable European literature, largely 
focusing on the application of a carbon and/or energy tax (for a recent summary see 
Markandya, 2009).  A number of European models conclude that a switch in taxation 
from labor to carbon/energy will increase employment and reduce carbon emissions. 
At the same time it will increase GDP.  Hence there is some agreement on this 'good 
news'.  The differences are about the size of the impacts in employment, output and 
emissions.  For the 1992 carbon/energy tax, which was assumed to rise to $10 per 
barrel of oil equivalent over about 7 years, the size of the employment impact ranged 
from 0.4 to 2.6 percent by the end of that period across the different models. This was 
for various groupings of EU countries and should therefore be treated with caution, but 
it is still instructive about the range of estimates.  The GDP increases range from 0.4 to 
2.2 percent.  It is also interesting that more recent work, such as that carried out by the 
Danish national government to evaluate its carbon tax program ex post reveals impacts 
at the lower end of these ranges. Indeed rigorous evaluations of actual programs are 
very rare in this field and more are required.   
 
This paper looks at the empirical issues in a somewhat more complex framework.  We 
examine first the implications of taxes on key local air pollutants, without a carbon tax, 
to see what impacts they have on emissions and on key economic variables.  The levels 
of the taxes are set at rates that correspond fully to the estimated marginal damage 
costs as given by recent European studies (see Preiss et al. 2008, Wissema and Dellink 
2007, Kiuila and Markandya 2006); needless to say these rates are very much higher 
than any actually attempted in any economy. In addition we then superimpose a 
carbon tax, also set in a range that reflects the current consensus on the external costs 
from emissions of CO2 through climate change.  We do this to see the additional 
impacts as well as to understand the joint effects of the system of environmental taxes 
that reflects something closer to internalization of external effects in the case air 
emissions. 1   
 
In addition to the level of the taxes there are two other aspects of the tax structure 
that are explored in the paper.  The first is the extent of coverage: whether the tax is on 
all sources or just some of them.  In particular the inclusion or otherwise of mobile 
sources is an important dimension.  The second is the way in which any tax revenues 
are treated: they can be used to increase government expenditure or they can be 
redistributed and if the latter there are several ways of redistributing them. 
                                                          
1
 The revenue neutral model allows us to focus on the effect of a different structure of government 
subsidy/tax system on welfare, separating the fiscal effect coming from changing government revenues. 
(Martinez de Prera, 2000) In this paper, we focus on the direct effect of the structure of the fiscal policies 
on behaviours and thus keep the revenue neutrality in the model. 
 5 
 
 
In summary we analyze seven scenarios:   
a) Air pollution taxes at close to marginal damage levels on stationary emission 
sources (referred to in the paper as Scenario A) 
b) CO2 taxes at two different rates given in the literature on stationary emission 
sources (referred to as Scenarios B17 and B30) 
c) CO2 taxes on the higher rate given in the literature on stationary and mobile 
emission sources (referred to as Scenario B30M) 
d) CO2 taxes on the higher rate given in the literature plus taxes on air pollution at 
rates close to marginal damages with no recycling of revenues, with lump-sum 
recycling and with recycling via a payroll tax (referred to as Scenarios C30, C30-
lsp and C30-ssp). In these last set of scenarios the carbon taxes are imposed on 
both stationary and mobile emission sources but the air quality taxes remain on 
only stationary sources. 
 
This means that Scenario C30 consists of tax increases as assumed in Scenario A plus 
Scenario B30M. This allows us to evaluate the impacts of additional effects of different 
taxes and different levels of coverage and recycling without generating too many 
simulation results. 
 
The analysis has been carried out for a small European economy (Czech Republic) using 
a state-of-the-art CGE model that allows for unemployment2 in the labor market and 
that includes options for abatement of a number of local pollutants in an innovative 
way that is explained below.  The results demonstrate that the emission level of some 
pollutants, such as particulate matter (PM), has a strongly non-linear relationship with 
the emission charge rate.  Using a unique environmental database, our energy-
environment CGE model includes five types of fuels as factors, five local air pollutants 
(SO2, NOx, PM, CO, VOCs) and CO2 emissions, with emission coefficients separately 
specified for each type of fuel, each economic sector and household, and for three 
types of emission sources. Including the different emission coefficients across different 
energy source and sectors allows us to implicitly embed the difference in the 
abatement technology across sectors and energy type. We believe such CGE modeling 
of both local and global pollutants for several types of emission sources, with a wide 
range of abatement options and the fuel- and sector specific emissions of six 
                                                          
2
 The model set as a baseline the unemployment rate in 2005 (8%).The unemployment rate and labour 
market conditions in the Czech Republic are historically stable. Even when the crisis hit the economy 
(2008-2009) the unemployment rate barely reached to 10%. Prior to the crisis, in the boom the Czech 
economy experienced the lowest unemployment 5.8 % (OECD Economic Outlook database). Thus we 
have not calibrated our model at any extreme value of unemployment. 
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pollutants, is the first of its kind.  For this reason alone its results should be of 
particular interest. 
 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows.  Section II provides the institutional 
background, section III describes the model used, Section IV sets out the options 
considered, Section V reports the main results and Section VI sets out some 
conclusions and indications for future research. 
 
2. Institutional background 
 
There is quite a long tradition in the CEE region of using “market-based instruments” in 
environmental regulation, particularly air emission charges. These charges, however, 
have not been effective in achieving significant abatement; nor are they efficient with 
respect to correcting for negative externalities (Ščasný and Máca, 2009). Despite the 
fact that air pollution charges were among the first economic instruments introduced 
in the Czech Republic (as long ago as 1967, during the socially-planned system), the 
Czech Republic was one of the most polluted countries in Europe. Its economy was 
very intensive on pollution, natural resources and energy use; for instance, the Czech 
economy generated almost 16 tons of CO2, 61 kg of PM or 0.2 kg of SO2 per capita and 
used almost 500 tons per capita in the year 1990, i.e. the first year of economic and 
political transformation.  To put it in perspective, the 16 tons of CO2 in 1990 compares 
with 7.8 tones for the EU27 in 2008, with a level of GDP per capita that is more than 3 
times higher than that of the Czech Republic in 1990.  
 
Both the deep decline and re-structuring of the Czech economy in the first four years of 
the 90’s caused a significant reduction in CO2 emissions and total primary energy 
supply (by 23%, or 15% respectively). Moreover, as a response to the nation’s bad air 
quality, a new Clean Air Act was introduced, based on a strict command-and-control 
regulation required polluters to fulfill  emission targets by 1998.  As a result the country 
saw large reductions in emissions of PM, SO2 and NOx (by 90%, 86% and 47% 
respectively in 1999 compared to their 1990 levels). 
 
Most of these improvements, however, occurred before 1994. Since that year CO2 
emissions and energy use have remained at a more or less stable level and the relative 
performance of both indicators has only improved thanks to increasing GDP. Newly 
introduced economic instruments in the 2000’s were also ineffective due to low tax 
rates (energy taxes) and to the over-allocation of CO2 allowances within the EU ETS. In 
the case of air pollutants only slight reductions were seen in the 2000s; once the 
operators fulfilled the emission limits set by the authority by 1998, the emission levels 
were reduced only slightly or not at all over whole 2000’s.  
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Meanwhile, the Czech authorities discussed several options to make energy taxes and 
air emission charges more effective (Ščasný et al., 2009).  At the end of 2000’s, the 
Czech Ministry of the Environment made a proposal to increase the nominal rates for 
SO2, NOx, PM and VOC emissions charges about 10-fold, but these rates would still 
represent only about 3% of pollutant-specific damage costs and, being well below the 
marginal costs of abatement, they did not motivate any abatement in emissions (Rečka 
and Ščasný, 2013). Nowadays, large stationary emission sources in the Czech Republic 
are regulated by several different instruments that include a tax on energy products 
and emission charges (both with quite small, ineffective rates), the EU ETS being 
enforced together with IPCC integrated permits and limits on pollutant concentration 
in flue gases.  
 
It is clear from the above that the system of regulation of air pollution has not been 
that effective in the Czech Republic and has signs of being unclear and burdensome.  
There is therefore a strong desire to increase its efficiency.  
 
At the same time there is a desire to reduce the heavy dependence on the taxation on 
labor; in the year 2005, about 50% of total public revenues were collected from labor 
taxation (personal income tax plus obligatory health and social insurance 
contributions). Tax on goods and services (value added tax, excise taxes, duties) 
brought about 28%, while taxation of profits contributed by 11%. The rest was 
collected from non-tax public revenues. The Czech government has made several 
attempts to introduce tax reforms that would shift the tax burden from direct taxation, 
especially from labor, towards to indirect taxes (see, Brůha and Ščasný 2005 for a 
review). These governmental attempts partly motivate the inclusion in this paper of a 
scenario that examines revenue recycling based on lowering labor taxation.  
 
3. CGE model with abatement technologies 
 
The Czech economy is described by a static Arrow-Debreu model of a small-open 
economy. It consists of 20 sectors, 7 factors of production – capital (K), labor (L), five 
energy factors (E) represented by gas, coal, oil, biomass, and electricity – one 
representative household, and government. The structure corresponds to that given by 
the Czech 2005 input-output table.  
 
A sectoral classification of the model is described in Table 1, which provides the factors 
and materials (M) intensity and relative share of inputs demand per sector. For 
example, the labor share of total inputs used in the electricity sector (numbered by 19) 
is 6%, while capital, energy and other materials contribute 40%, 36% and 18% 
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respectively in the production of electricity.  This sector demands, however, only 1% of 
labor from the labor market, 4% of capital from the capital market, 12% of electricity 
from electricity market, and 1% of materials from the aggregated market of 
commodities. 
 
Table 1: Products classification and input intensities 
Sector 
No. 
Name of the product CPA code 
Inputs intensity [%] 
Share of inputs demand 
[%] 
K L E* M K L E* M 
1 Minerals 26 19 13 4 64 2 2 1 2 
2 Metallurgy 27 10 6 8 76 2 1 4 4 
3 Heating 40.3 13 8 27 51 1 0 3 1 
4 Energy intensive 17,20,21 13 11 12 64 2 2 6 3 
5 Energy not intensive 18,19,22 11 15 0 74 1 2 0 2 
6 Manufacturing 12-14,16,25,28-37 10 10 1 79 13 17 5 32 
7 Chemicals & petrochemicals 24 15 8 19 58 2 1 7 2 
8 Construction 45 13 10 2 75 7 7 4 11 
9 Food 15 11 8 1 80 3 2 1 6 
10 Agriculture 1.5 28 16 5 51 3 2 2 2 
11 Road transportation 60 22 20 9 49 4 4 5 2 
12 Other transportation 61-64 29 9 2 60 9 4 2 5 
13 Market service 40.2,41,50-55,65-74 28 16 2 54 37 27 7 21 
14 Public service 75-99 19 34 8 39 11 26 16 7 
15 Coal 10 29 20 6 45 1 1 1 0 
16 Biomass 2 39 13 27 20 1 0 2 0 
17 Gas & crude oil 11 56 5 38 1 0 0 0 0 
18 Coke & petroleum products 23 3 1 79 16 0 0 23 0 
19 Electricity 40.1 40 6 36 18 4 1 12 1 
20 Abatement NA 100 0 0 0 0** 0 0 0 
 Total      100 100 100 100 
 
Note: Inputs intensities are represented by net values.  
*Energy factor composite does not include Heating (it is a part of materials in the model).  
** There is no abatement process in the benchmark. 
 
Emissions of SO2, NOx, CO2, CO, PM, VOCs are taken into account in the following ways.  
Emission reductions are possible through: (a) a substitution with less polluting 
production factors, (b) use of a technical abatement process, and (c) a reduction of the 
activity level. Producers and households are both considered as pollution emitters. We 
take into account emission coefficients per agent (19 producers and 1 household), per 
pollutant (6 types), and per source (3 emission sources that include fuel combustion at 
stationary sources, technological processes and mobile emission sources).  Thus the 
model contains almost 1,500 specific emission coefficients. These coefficients are 
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expressed in tons of pollutant per unit of economic output (GVA) that allows us to 
determine the increase in the production price due to any emission’s charge.  
 
The model can analyze a range of policy instruments, namely:  emission charges, 
carbon and energy taxes, emissions permits, and command-and-control measures (e.g. 
emission limits). Energy and pollution taxes increase the costs of affected industries 
and may reduce their economic performance, including international competitiveness. 
On the other hand, the tax revenue generated by the energy tax allows a reduction in 
other distortionary taxes in the economy.   Hence the model allows for the possibility 
of a double dividend (if any).  
 
Like most CGE models, this one is based partly on the neoclassic theory of general 
equilibrium: it calculates the prices and volumes of production which equalize demand 
with supply in all markets and make marginal profits equal to zero in all sectors (further 
details can be found in the Technical Appendix3). For each good with an established 
positive price, aggregate demand equals to aggregate supply in equilibrium. In the 
situation of excessive supply the equilibrium price is set at zero. However, this 
equilibrium does not apply to the labor market, current account balance, and other 
parts of the model where market imperfections are explicitly accounted for. 
 
Consumers 
Final domestic demand is represented by households and government in order to 
distinguish between private and public consumption. All households in the economy 
have been aggregated into one household, which receives income from employment, 
from a share of the firms’ profits (including income from capital) and from the 
government.  Private demand is represented by a Linear Expenditure System, while the 
public demand is described by a Leontief function (i.e. the relative shares are constant). 
 
The government collects taxes, makes and receives transfer payments and purchases 
goods and services.  Expenditures by the government are exogenous but the revenue is 
modeled in detail to reflect the Czech tax system and includes nine tax categories. 
These are: value added tax, excise tax (for manufacturing goods, food and petroleum 
products), social security paid by employees, social security paid by employers, 
personal income tax, capital income tax, emission charges (including carbon tax), and 
other net taxes on products and production. 
 
  
                                                          
3
 Available on request from the authors. 
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Producers 
Producers are assumed to minimize costs subject to their production function. Total 
production of each sector is the sum of production of individual producers, however, 
the model assumes only a single producer for each sector. This means that the model 
does not allow for intra-industry competition, because there is a uniform price for the 
sector’s output. Domestic competition comes only from other sectors and all firms are 
risk neutral. There are five categories of sectors: 
- six types of energy (coal, biomass, gas and crude oil, coke and petroleum 
products, electricity, and heating);  
- two types of services (market service and public service);  
- two types of transportation (road and other);  
- nine types of production (minerals, metallurgy, energy intensive production, 
energy non-intensive production, manufacturing, chemicals and 
petrochemicals, construction, food, and agriculture) 
- pollution abatement  
 
Sectoral output (except abatement) is determined by a Leontief technology for 14 
materials (intermediate demand) combined with a nested CES structure (represented 
by 7 production factors). Figure 1 shows the schematic form of the production 
structure.  All factors of production are mobile between sectors but labor and capital 
are only mobile domestically. In the case of the capital market, capital supply is fixed 
and demand is given by the CES production function.  The market determines the price 
of capital so that demand and supply are equated.  
 
As far as the labor market is concerned, there is assumed to be a fixed supply of labor 
and a nominal gross wage that responds to unemployment.  The neoclassical axiom of 
flexible wages is suspended through the wage curve. This curve assumes that real 
wages are declining function of the local unemployment rate. Thus high 
unemployment leads to lower real wages. The intersection of this wage curve (not the 
supply curve) with the labour demand curve determines the employment level and 
labour cost. Labour supply curve determines wage rate for a given employment level. 
Finally, the difference between labour supply and employment level determines 
unemployment4.  
 
                                                          
4
 The first such wage curve was directly incorporated into CGE modelling by Rutherford and Light (2002). 
An alternative technique is to fix the nominal wage (Yin 2002). We followed the first technique, which is 
also the more popular (see Partridge, 2010; Kuester, 2007; Bhattarai, 2008) as it opens the possibility of 
unemployment if the demand for labor (which is determined according to profit maximization 
conditions) is less than the available supply at a gross real wage.  
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Fig. 1. Production Structure 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
As far as the energy sector is concerned, the six types of energy enter as inputs into a 
set of CES production functions.  A CES function assumes a constant elasticity of 
substitution between production factors. In order to specify variable (non-constant) 
substitution possibilities between these factors, we employ a set of nested separable 
CES functions.  
 
The general specification of CES cost functions is the same for all sectors, but 
parameters differ across the sectors.  For example, coal and biomass enter at the 
bottom of the nest with a constant elasticity of substitution σCB.   At the next level of 
the nested structure, gas and coal-biomass composite combine with another constant 
substitution elasticity σGC, etc. In the top nest, labor and composite capital-energy 
show trade off with a new value of σLK.  In addition, there are ‘feedstocks’  -- i.e. goods 
and services such as heating that enter in the materials aggregate in the model using 
the Leontief function.  
 
To summarize, the sector’s objective is to minimize total cost for a given level of 
output, assuming free disposal. A zero profit condition is applied for each sector under 
constant returns to scale, except the abatement sector, where decreasing returns to 
scale are applied. 
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Pollution abatement 
A special feature of the model is accounting for emissions of five local pollutants as 
well as CO2.  The model imposes charges and taxes on these emissions, as a result of 
which emissions can fall though: (i) reduced output of the polluting goods, (ii) 
substitution with less polluting inputs, and (iii) installation of end-of-pipe abatement 
technologies (only for SO2, NOx and PM due to data availability).  The way pathway (i) 
works is self-explanatory.   As far as substitution with less polluting inputs is concerned 
(pathway (ii)) this takes place through the nested CES functions described above.   
Emissions can be reduced through (a) inter-fuel substitution within the energy 
aggregate and (b) substitution between energy and other factors.  Finally for the 
pathway (iii) of end of pipe abatement there are 36 available abatement technologies 
for SO2, 63 for NOx, and 61 - for PM10.  The data comes from “RAINS” - the bottom-up 
model developed by IIASA (Amann et al., 2004; more in Ščasný et al., 2010). We 
assume that the cost of abatement represents just a capital cost because no detailed 
information on other cost items is available. Emissions of CO2 can be reduced through 
decreasing economic activity or fuel substitution, i.e. switching the energy source to 
cleaner one; as such, no end-of-pipe technology, such as carbon capture and storage, 
are implemented into our model. 
 
There are a number of ways in which abatement technologies can be modelled.  
We follow here an activity analysis approach as used by Kiuila and Rutherford (2013) in 
order to directly implement a bottom-up function based on engineering data for 
pollution abatement process into a CGE model. Such a structure allows our model to 
impose environmental levies on several pollutants, as a result of which emissions can 
fall through the three pathways we have identified above. An alternative approach is to 
link CGE model with a bottom-up model in order to represent technologies explicitly 
(see Barker and Scrieciu 2010)5. 
                                                          
5 
Installations of abatement technologies can also be considered as inputs for the firms, as has been 
done within GEM-E3 model (Capros et al., 2008), rather than as an investment.  The flexibility of this 
approach is limited and specifying explicitly marginal abatement cost (MAC) curve is data hungry. A 
precise and more flexible approach, and one requiring less data, is to specify the production function 
explicitly in terms of pollution abatement. To date, however, there have been only few such applications. 
The first was by Jorgenson and Wilcoxen (1990). Later Nordhaus and Yang (1996) implemented a 
quadratic abatement cost curve. Ellerman and Decaux (1998) fitted simple analytical forms to a set of 
MAC curves and investigated the robustness of MACs with respect to abatement levels among regions. 
Hyman et al. (2002) implemented a constant elasticity of substitution abatement function. Dellink (2005) 
proposed an ordinary least square estimation to cover as much information as possible on the technical 
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Following the activity analysis, the abatement sector has a different structure from 
other sectors.  We assume that the abatement possibilities are related to the whole 
economy, i.e. the marginal cost of abatement is applied for the whole economy rather 
than for specific sector.  There are only two inputs for abatement activity Q: capital and 
pollutants. Instead of taking a smooth cost function, we have applied a step function 
(Figure 2a). Each step of this function is described by a Leontief function (the approach 
is known as activity analysis). Substitution possibilities between inputs (capital versus 
emission) are described by the characteristics of available technologies, including those 
which are inactive in the benchmark. 
 
The calibration of the abatement function is different from other production functions 
in the model.  In this activity analysis approach we directly integrate a bottom-up cost 
curve into the CGE model. A disadvantage of this approach is the limited number of 
available technologies and once we have used all of them we have a bounded solution. 
An advantage is the possibility to identify active technologies in the counterfactual 
equilibrium. The potential to reduce pollution through technical abatement activities 
provides an upper bound on abatement in the model. The remaining part of pollution 
can be reduced only through decreasing economic activity or fuels substitution. 
 
 Fig. 2a. Step versus smooth marginal cost curve 
 
                                                                                                                                                                          
measures underlying the abatement options, while Revesz and Balabanov (2007) defined an average 
abatement cost function using a degree of abatement possibilities and a scaling factor.  
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Fig. 2b. Environmental instruments
 
Environmental policy 
 
Four different environmental policies can be considered within the model. First, there 
are emission charges and the carbon tax (tem). Agents have a choice to undertake 
abatement (more energy efficient production or less pollution intensive inputs) or to 
pay charges on their emissions. The abatement cost MAC shifts the sectoral supply 
curve MC upward. The price for the good N being produced goes up from PN0 to PN1, 
as shown in Figure 2b. Emission charges imply that market price for good N grows to 
PN2+tem. The resulting gross welfare loss is the abatement expenditures (the dotted 
area) plus the market distortion (the dashed area). This is a result of a gain in a tax 
revenue (the grey rectangle) and loss in both producer and consumer surplus. The net 
effect on consumer surplus of the emission charges will be always negative. The net 
effect on producer surplus will depend on abatement possibilities and on the own-
price elasticity. When a sector is very capital intensive, the elasticity of supply will be 
small and the sector will have to absorb an important part of the increase in marginal 
cost (MAC+tem). The total effect of emission charges and taxes is a reduced output level 
in addition to reduced emission level. 
 
Second, the government can decide to tax the polluting goods directly as an output tax 
(tn) and avoid the taxation of clean goods. Under this regulatory scheme, firms will 
never abate their emissions, because the tax is levied on the amount of output of 
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polluting goods and this is independent from the abatement expenditures by firms.  A 
similar interpretation can be applied for an excise tax.  
 
Third, tradable emission permits can be implemented using emission quotas. One 
permit allows a sector to produce one unit of emission. Firms can obtain more permits 
by trading. The model allows for setting emission quotas using different regimes, but 
no international emission trading is possible.  Firms can either buy all the permits they 
require through auctions, or the permit may be allocated for free based on past 
emissions (known as grandfathering). In either case a price emerges for permits, based 
on the demand and supply and that price is endogenous (opposite to the first policy 
instrument).   
 
Fourth, revenue from emission charges (taxes) or auctioned emission permits can be 
recycled back to economy. Two recycling schemes are considered: lump-sum recycling 
and reduction of labor tax. In a system with lump-sum recycling, there is no difference 
between auctioned and grandfathered permits. In a system of labor tax reduction, we 
consider only a social security paid by employers. 
 
The environmental instruments described above will lead to a different equilibrium. 
We start from the benchmark point, where environmental charges and output tax were 
already applied. Other described instruments of environmental policy were not applied 
in the Czech Republic at that period. Emission charges and auctioned permits would 
lead to the same equilibrium, if the issued permits are equal to the emission reduction 
under the tax scheme. Both instruments have an impact on the output of the firms 
who pay the charges (permits), but also on other firms as the prices of pollution 
intensive goods go up.  The charges also impact on the trade sector, to the extent that 
they make imports more attractive relative to domestic goods, whose prices have risen.   
 
Open economy 
 
The model describes a small open economy. A new actor ’the world’ represents rest of 
the world. The export supply is represented by a constant elasticity of transformation 
(CET) function, while export demand is infinitely elastic. When the elasticity of 
transformation is relatively high, there is little price difference between the domestic 
and international markets and small changes in the international price will result in big 
shifts in supply from one market to another.  The elasticity of transformation is 
assumed to be equal to 4 for all sectors, based on values commonly used in this 
literature (Hillberry and Hummels, 2012). 
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Since the country exports and imports the same aggregate products, we assume, as is 
common to all such models, that there is imperfect substitutability between 
domestically produced goods and imported goods.  An import demand function is 
defined, based on a CES function with the Armington assumption.  Under this 
assumption the goods produced in the country can be sold at higher prices than world 
prices to the extent that they are different from the corresponding goods in the world 
market. This implicit market power is expressed by elasticity of substitution equal 4 for 
all sectors (based on values in the literature), except the gas sector, where it is set at 
20. This very limited market power for the Czech gas sector (it covers also crude oil) is 
explained by the extreme import dependence of the country on that fuels (96% of 
supply). 
 
Demand in the domestic market is met from domestic production and imports.  
Domestic supply depends on world prices and the elasticity of substitution as given 
above and domestic prices are determined so that domestic and imported supplies 
equal domestic demand. Neither export quotas nor import tariffs are present in the 
model (a free trade assumption), because they were relatively small in 2005 for the 
Czech economy. Thus c.i.f import prices are fixed and equal to f.o.b. export prices. We 
choose to define the exchange rate as a numeraire. 
 
Computation of policy dividends  
 
Ligthart and van der Ploeg (1999), following Bovenberg and van der Ploeg (1996), 
distinguish four types of dividend to indicate the various components of social welfare, 
as described in Figure 3.  The Green dividend corresponds to any improvements in 
environmental quality, pink is related to employment gains, red is associated with 
public consumption, and blue is attributed to (economic) profits.  Linghart and van der 
Ploeg (ibid.) then define three double dividends. An ‘employment double dividend’ 
exists if the green and pink dividends occur together. A ‘social double dividend’ is 
secured if both the green and red dividends are positive. And a ‘triple dividend’ is 
obtained if the green, pink, and red dividends are simultaneously realized. We follow 
this approach in our paper to investigate all three double dividends based on the 
results from our model. 
 
In our case, economic welfare, employment gains and public consumption are derived 
directly from the model. However, the environmental benefits are computed outside of 
the model.  We consider that each unit of emission causes damage to human health, 
crops and loss of biodiversity i.e. negative external costs. Abated emissions therefore 
reduce such damages and thereby increase the environmental benefits. To derive this 
benefit in money terms, we multiply the volume of avoided emissions by the 
 24 
 
corresponding unit damage as estimated using the ExtemE method in the EU-wide 
research projects NEEDS and CASES (Weinzettel et al. 2012, Preiss et al. 2008).  
Specifically, we use following damage factors: for PM of €21,400 per ton, €9,270 for 
SO2, €10,400 for NOx and €23.5 for ton of CO2 (all expressed in Euro 2005 prices). The 
environmental benefit based on these values is then included in the net changes in 
economic welfare.  
 
 
Fig. 3. Composition of Social Welfare and Corresponding Dividends  
Source: Based on Bovenberg and van der Ploeg (1996) and Lindhert and van der Ploeg 
(1999). 
 
  
4. Definition of Policy Scenarios 
 
The primarily goal of our study is to analyse direct and ancillary effects of energy-
climate policy package and air quality charges policy that would fully internalise 
external costs. Table 2 provides data on energy use and emissions from different 
sources and sectors for the base year, 2005.  It shows that combustion of fossil fuel: 
([1] in Table 2) accounts for most of the energy use and also for the highest share of 
emissions of CO2, SO2 and NOx in the Czech Republic.  Mobile sources (row [2] in Table 
2) and technological processes (row [3]) each account for about 10% of energy use and 
households for about 13%.  
 
The environmental and economic effects of the regulation that was enforced in the 
base 2005 year are implicitly included in Social Accounting Matrix and hence embodied 
in the baseline scenario.  The policies that we model are additional to the ones that 
were already in place in the year 2005. Our policies however do not assume other 
instruments that might have been implemented and enforced since 2006. 
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Table 2: Energy use and releases of pollutants by emission sources, Czech Republic 
2005 [%]. 
 
Emission sources Energy use CO2 PM SO2 NOx 
[1] fuel combustion (sectors) 67 64 23 84 41 
[2] mobile sources (sectors) 11 11 19 0 37 
[3] technological processes 
(sectors) 
9 14 10 6 8 
[4] fuel combustion  (households) 8 6 41 10 3 
[5] mobile sources (households)  5 5 7 0 12 
Total 100 100 100 100 100 
 
In our policy scenarios, we impose a tax on carbon with or without the simultaneous 
taxation of air pollutants and each of these policies is assumed to be introduced in the 
two most-energy intensive emission segments, i.e. fuel combustion [1] and mobile 
sources [2] related to business activity (Table 2). These two segments are responsible 
for almost 80% of total energy use,  as well as a major part of CO2, SO2 and NOx 
emissions, and about a half of particulate matters.  Thus they play the key role in 
environmental and energy policy.  
 
Table 3: Energy use, CO2 and air emission by sector as percentage of totals from all 
sectors 
CGE sector 
ENERGY USE CO2 PM SO2 NOx 
comb mobile comb Mobile comb Mobile comb mobile comb mobile 
Minerals 0.5 0.2 0.3 0.2 0.3 1 0.2 0 0.1 0.5 
Metallurgy 6 0.1 5 0.1 1 0.3 3 0 1 0.2 
Heating 17 0.1 18 0.1 10 0.2 34 0 11 0.2 
Energy intensive 9 0.2 1 0.2 6 0.5 2 0 1 0.5 
Energy not intensive 0.1 0 0.1 0 0 0.1 0 0 0 0.1 
Manufacturing 2 1 1 1 2 3 1 0 1 2 
Chemicals & petrochemicals 5 0.1 6 0.1 3 0.2 9 0 4 0.2 
Construction 0.2 1 0.1 1 0.4 3 0.1 0 0.1 3 
Food 2 1 1 1 2 2 2 0 1 2 
Agriculture 0.3 1 0.2 1 2 12 0.3 0 0.1 16 
Road transportation 0.4 6 0.3 5 0.1 15 0.1 0.1 0.2 13 
Other transportation 0.1 1 0.1 2 0.1 2 0 0 0 4 
Market service 3 2 4 2 2 5 2 0 1 4 
Public service 2 1 1 1 2 2 1 0 0.5 2 
Coal 2 0.1 1 0.1 1 0.3 6 0 2 0.3 
Biomass 0 0.1 0 0 0.2 0.2 0 0 0 0.3 
Gas & crude oil 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Coke & petroleum products 1 0 1 0 0.2 0 0.5 0 0.3 0 
Electricity 36 0 45 0 25 0 41 0 30 0 
TOTAL 86 14 85 15 56 44 100 0 52 48 
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Note:  emission and energy use by technological processes and by households are excluded 
 
The 19 producing sectors contribute differently to releases of pollutants that are 
regulated within our policy scenarios, as shown in Table 3. For example, fuel 
combustion in electricity and heat sectors is responsible for a majority of CO2 emission 
released from these two emission segments, 45% and 18%, respectively. Mobile 
sources in total are responsible for only 15% of regulated CO2 emission, and majority of 
them are generated by road transport, 5%. 
 
Overall then we define seven policy scenarios as detailed in Table 4. First scenario (A) 
increases actual air emission charges at the level of external costs that emissions of 
SO2, NOx, and PM cause, that are €9,270 per tonne of SO2, €10,400 per tonne of NOx 
and €21,400 per ton of particulate matters (based on the impact pathway approach of 
the ExternE method, see Preiss et al. 2008; Weinzettel et al. 2012). The actual rates of 
emission charges in the year 2005 are subtracted from the levels of externalities to get 
net effect of policy. 
The next three scenarios assume only a carbon tax. In scenarios B17 and B30 the 
carbon tax is levied on emissions from fuel combustion only, while scenario B30M 
extends the coverage of taxed subjects and imposes the carbon tax also on emissions 
from mobile sources. The rates of carbon tax correspond to a carbon price as it has 
been estimated by the European Commission for a 20% or a 30% emission reduction 
target (EC 2010), that equal to €17 or €30 per tonne CO2 respectively. These rates also 
cover quite well a range of marginal abatement costs as reviewed, for instance, by 
Carraro and Favero (2009), and correspond to the estimates of social cost of carbon, 
see, for instance, a review by e.g. Tol (2009).  
 
Scenario (C30) combines two other scenarios: A and B30M. While in the scenario 
B30M we examine what is an effect of extending coverage of a carbon tax subjects to 
include mobile sources, in C30 we aim to assess effect of a policy that extends the tax 
base by imposing a tax on both carbon and air pollutants. We wish to examine in 
particular whether the effect of policy that tax carbon and air pollutants are different 
than a sum of effects of two separate scenarios.  
 
The five policy scenarios described above (A, B17, B30, B30M and C30) do not assume 
any revenue recycling.  The last two scenarios consider a revenue neutral tax reform 
and recycle all additional revenues either via a lump-sum payment to households (C30-
lsp), or via cuts in social security contributions paid by employers (C30-ssc).   
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Table 4: Definition of policy scenarios  
  
BAU  
(benchmark) 
Scenarios 
A B17 B30 B30M C30 C30-lsp C30-ssc 
Carbon tax [rate in € per t] 
CO2 - - 17  30  30  30  30  30  
Subjects taxed - - combustion  combustion 
combustion 
& mobile  
combustion  
& mobile  
combustion  
& mobile  
combustion  
& mobile  
Charge on AQ emission [rates in € per t] 
PM 101  21 389  - - - 21 389  21 389  21 389  
SO2 34  9 301  - - - 9 301  9 301  9 301  
NOx 27  10 409  - - - 10 409  10 409  10 409  
VOC 67  - - - - - - - 
Subjects taxed 
combustion & 
technological 
combusti
on  
- - - combustion  combustion  combustion  
Policy parameters 
Revenues 
recycled 
no  no   no   no   no   no   lump-sum    labour 
 
Note: BAU scenario also includes a charge on CO emissions. Its rate of 20 € per ton is very small and the charging CO 
emissions generates negligible revenue. Air emission charge rates correspond to the nominal rates as valid since 
2003 to date.  
 
Overall, these policies imply direct costs related to the tax and charge payments in a 
range of 40 bln CZK (B17) to 172 bln. CZK (C30) that corresponds to a range of 0.5% to 
2.0% of before-policy total costs (defined as total intermediate consumption plus 
labour and capital costs, net taxes and imports).  Most of the sectors would bear costs 
less than 1% of before-policy costs, exceptions being the direct costs of (petro) 
chemicals, metallurgy and road transport.  We also see that while the tax and charge 
burden could be up to 67% and 83% of the pre-policy level in the two power sectors: 
electricity and heating respectively. The direct costs however do not assume any 
behavioural response of agents, nor do they reflect general equilibrium effects and 
thus the direct costs should not be interpreted as the economic costs of policy. 
5. Key Results 
The analysis of the scenarios is divided into the four sections. All estimates are 
reported as percentage deviations from the BAU, which corresponds to the benchmark 
level in our analysis (i.e. the current systems of taxes and control).  
 
5.1. Energy demand 
The impacts of the different taxes on energy demand, including public consumption, 
are shown in Figure 4.  We note the following: 
 28 
 
a. The reduction in total energy demand is greater with pollution charges than 
with carbon tax.  
b. A carbon tax at 17€/ton reduces total energy demand by 5%.  Raising the tax to 
30€/ton makes the reduction slightly larger at 7% and extending coverage to 
mobile sources raises it further to 8%.  Thus the extension of coverage to 
mobile sources only has a small impact on energy demand. 
c. Combining the pollution taxes and a carbon tax of 30€ makes the reduction in 
energy demand equal to 14% to 15%, depending on how the tax revenues are 
redistributed. 
d. The largest effect of the taxes is on coal, where pollution charges could cause 
reductions by 40% and carbon taxes by 25-30%.  The two instruments 
combined cause a reduction in coal demand by 45%. 
e. The demand for petroleum products is affected notably when the carbon tax is 
extended to mobile sources.   
 
Fig. 4. Energy consumption [% BAU] 
 
 
Table 5: Percentage Deviations in Emissions from BAU (Except last Row) 
  A B17 B30 B30M C30 C30-lsp C30-ssc 
        
NOX -58 -13 -17 -20 -64 -63 -63 
SO2 -58 -26 -35 -34 -64 -64 -64 
PM -58 -7 -9 -10 -61 -61 -61 
VOC -13 -3 -5 -8 -17 -16 -15 
CO2 -34 -22 -29 -30 -41 -41 -41 
CO2, 1990 base -46 -37 -42 -43 -52 -52 -52 
GDP loss, € per ton CO2* 31 19 26 30 47 47 37 
Note: * Cost of carbon is expressed in GDP loss in 2005 € per tonne of CO2 abated. 
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5.2. Environmental benefits and ancillary effects 
As the policies intend, the volume of emissions is reduced with introduction of a 
carbon tax and air emission charges (see Table 5). We note that all scenarios suppose 
pricing of pollutants via taxes with rates that correspond to environmental damage, i.e. 
the external costs, attributable to concerned pollutant. While Scenario A imposes a tax 
on local air pollutants released from the stationary sources, scenarios B’s impose 
carbon tax of 17€ per ton of CO2, or 30€ respectively.  Scenarios C’s assume both types 
of pollutants are taxed with same rates as in Scenario A or B30. These policies, similarly 
as Scenario B30M, introduce then a stricter regulation not only on combustion sources, 
but also on transport.  The following are worth noting: 
a. Pollution taxes reduce emissions of the three local pollutants that are taxed 
(NOx, SO2 and PM) by 58%.  The carbon tax alone reduces these emissions by 
varying amounts: 7-10% for PM, 13-20% for NOx, and 26-35% for SO2.  Thus a 
higher carbon tax contributes to an additional reduction of 2-3% for PM, 8-9% 
for SO2 and 4-7% for NOx. When both taxes are imposed together – C30 
scenarios – the reductions in local pollutants go up from 58% to 61-64%. 
b. The emissions of VOCs are also reduced even though there is no direct charge 
on VOC imposed in the policy scenarios, owing to the fact that VOCs emissions 
are directly related to energy from combustion sources. 
c. The reduction in CO2 is 34% when pollution charges are applied alone and 22-
29% when CO2 taxes are imposed alone.  When both sets of taxes are imposed 
together the reduction in CO2 is 41%. 
d. If a policy is one of imposing a tax on carbon only (scenarios B17, B30, B30M), 
then the effect on PM is quite small, regardless of how stringent the carbon 
policy is and whether transport is taxed as well. However, if we impose a charge 
on local pollutants, including PM, (that is Scenario A and Scenario C30), then 
PM emissions are reduced by a proportionally larger amount (-60% compared 
to -10% in B’s scenarios). Since our scenarios are imposing taxes on combustion 
processes sources only, including stationary and mobile, the affected tax bases 
are basically energy carriers. Due to the energy price increase, consumption of 
coal and oil is reduced more under A and C’s scenarios than under “B” 
scenarios, reflecting the higher PM-intensity of coal and oil carriers.   
Consequently, taxation of local pollutants results in a larger reduction in labor 
demand and hence higher unemployment. This implies that, due to the non-
linear tax interdependency, a policy that increases the price of PM-intensive 
goods would increase the distortion of the tax system significantly more than a 
policy that imposes tax on carbon only. Furthermore its policy effectiveness is 
compromised as a result.  In fact, it seems that the carbon tax slightly increases 
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labor demand, and hence can be welfare enhancing (see the  assessment of 
dividends below). 
e. As far as emissions reductions are concerned, the inclusion of mobile sources 
makes only a small difference. 
f. As noted there are three pathways for reduction emissions.  The relative 
importance of each of these is shown in Figure 5, which plots the respective 
shares for scenario C30 (similar results hold for the other scenarios).  The figure 
shows that abatement technology is responsible for 10% reduction of SO2 
emission, 28% of NOx emission and 42% for PM.  Output and factor mix 
changes account of 54% of the SO2 reductions, 35% of the NOx reductions and 
just under 20% of the PM reductions.  The dark bar in Figure 5 shows the 
remaining (net) emissions after the taxes have been imposed. 
 
Fig. 5. Sources of Reductions in Emissions and Net Emissions Remaining (% of BAU). 
 
 
 
g. We compute cost of carbon as GDP loss per ton of CO2 abated due to given 
policy. The abatement cost is the lowest under B17 scenario (about €19 per 
tonne) and the largest under C30 and C30-lsp (€47) due to larger negative effect 
of pollution taxation on GDP (see Table 6). 
h. The effect of a policy can be also expressed in terms of environmental benefits 
measured as the reduction in external costs attributable to local air pollutants 
and CO2 emissions avoided. The effect varies between 67-69€ (A-policies) and 
110€ per ton of CO2 avoided (C-policies). Adding to this a welfare impact due to 
reduction in consumption, the total welfare effect would be positive and range 
between 12€ (B30M) and 61€ per ton CO2 avoided (C30-ssc). 
i. If we consider all policies in terms of their carbon mitigation, the ancillary 
benefits of carbon mitigation (related to air quality impacts) would be the 
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lowest for carbon pricing (B-policies), 29€-31€ per t CO2 avoided. Local 
pollutant regulation (A-policy) would generate the highest ancillary benefits - 
69€ per t of CO2 avoided. Policy that simultaneously regulates both types of 
pollutants will generate then slightly lower ancillary benefits. 
 
Table 6: Economic effects in Euro per ton of CO2 avoided (Euro 2005) 
  A B17 B30 B30M C30 C30-lsp C30-ssc 
        
GDP loss 31 19 26 30 47 47 37 
Total welfare 51  25  18  12  29  48  61  
Avoided external costs 
(environmental benefits 
including climate chnage) 90  67  67  69  110  110  110  
Ancillary benefits (related 
to air quality impacts) 69  29  29  31  62  62  62  
 
 
j. Our analysis does show is that a policy of taxing only local pollutants (Policy A) 
exceeds the effect of all policies that are pricing carbon (Policies B’s). Policy A 
would generate GDP loss of 31€ per t of CO2 avoided, but it would also avoid 
externalities of about 90€ per t of CO2 and yield total welfare of +51€ per t 
CO2. On the other hand, B-policies would generate loss of GDP in a range of 
19€ to 30€ per t of CO2, avoid externalities of 67€-69€ and yield welfare gain of 
12€ to 25€ per t of CO2 abated. In this respect, a policy that prices local 
pollutants is economically more efficient than policies that tax carbon. Policy A 
is also more environmentally effective with respect to local pollutants and CO2 
reductions.  
We also find that the emission reductions of simultaneous taxation of local pollutants 
and CO2 (C30 scenario) would exceed the welfare gain of policy A or of policy B30M 
when introduced separately. It is true that the GDP loss with the C30 scenario is larger 
(47€ versus 19€ to 31€ per t CO2 avoided), but due to larger emission reductions, the 
welfare effect of Policy C30 exceeds the effect on welfare of all B-policies. Policy C is 
even welfare improving – resulting in higher total welfare than Policy A – if the tax 
revenues are recycled via lowering labor taxes. Positive effect on welfare requires that 
we consider both welfare from reduced consumption and welfare from environmental 
benefits.  
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5.3. GDP and Its Components  
Components of GDP 
Emission tax policies have their winners and their losers (Table 6).  These results are 
quite intuitive: output is reduced in the sectors with high emission coefficients and 
high energy intensity and the size of the effect increases with the level of the emissions 
charge and the carbon tax.   Table 6 provides a colour-coded guide to the expected 
impacts for seven scenarios.  The results are fairly similar across all the scenarios, with 
a few exceptions.   A light grey colour represents a reduced output, a dark grey an 
increased output and no colour represents the sectors where there is minimal change.  
 
Output is reduced most in the energy intensive sectors (Chemicals, Metallurgy) and in 
sectors that supply emission-intensive energy factors (Coal, Electricity and Petroleum). 
On the other hand, output is increased in Gas and Forest that supply environmentally-
friendly energy. Manufacturing and other energy less intensive sectors (Clothes) would 
also benefit from emission taxation. Outputs in Other transportation, Construction, 
Market and Public services, and Minerals are not affected by emission taxing policies.  
An unusual sector is Paper.  Although this sector consumes about 6% of total energy, it 
is responsible only for 1% of CO2 emissions and the taxes analysed do not have a major 
impact on its output. This is a consequence of large share of biomass use in this sector.   
 
Table 6: Percentage Changes in Output from BAU 
  A B17 B30 B30M C30 C30-lsp C30-ssc 
CHEM -51 -29 -41 -40 -61 -61 -62 
COAL -40 -24 -32 -33 -47 -47 -47 
ELEC -23 -16 -23 -22 -33 -33 -34 
AGRICUL -19 1 2 -1 -20 -19 -20 
PETRO -16 -4 -6 -10 -20 -20 -20 
METAL -11 -6 -11 -10 -18 -18 -18 
TRANSPR -10 0 0 -5 -13 -13 -12 
FOOD -9 1 1 -1 -10 -9 -9 
HEAT -8 -4 -5 -6 -11 -11 -10 
PAPER -4 0,3 0,2 -0,1 -5 -5 -5 
TRANSP -0,2 1 2 1 -0,1 -1 -1 
CONSTR -0,2 0,0 0,0 0,0 -0,3 -0,3 -0,1 
SERV 0,0 0,2 0,2 0,1 -0,4 0,4 1 
SERVPUB 0,2 1 2 3 1 -1 -1 
MINERAL 1 2 2 1 0,1 0,1 -1 
FOREST 2 3 5 6 5 5 3 
MANUF 10 3 4 5 11 12 14 
CLOTHES 12 4 7 8 17 19 26 
GAS 121 32 52 69 206 192 102 
Note: Domestic production of GAS sector represents only 4% of gas supply. 
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Except for three sectors, mobile sources taxation does not change sector outputs very 
much (compare B30 and B30M). Those three sectors are Road transportation, 
Petroleum products and Agriculture. While the output in the first is reduced due to 
higher costs of petroleum products, output in the second one is reduced as a 
consequence of reduced demand in the first one.  
 
If we extend coverage of taxation to include both local pollutants and carbon taxes the 
sectoral effects are magnified (compare B30M with the C scenarios).  Output of the 
losers is reduced further, and production of the winners is increased more. However, 
there are few sectors that were not affected by carbon taxing B-scenarios at all and 
that are now affected largely under C scenarios. Specifically, outputs in Agriculture and 
Food are reduced by 20% and 10% respectively, while the effect of carbon taxation on 
that sector was only -1%.  This is a consequence of their large intensity on emission of 
air quality pollutants, but not on carbon emission.  
 
The effect of the two recycling schemes appears especially in more labour-intensive 
sectors such as Clothes and Manufacturing. In those sectors, the output is increased 
when recycling via payroll tax, because of the decrease in burden of the labour 
taxation. Road transportation and Coal are also labour-intensive sectors (with labour 
shares higher than 20%) and the revenue recycling via payroll tax indeed increases 
slightly their output.  This effect, however, is not sufficiently strong to balance large 
negative effect of higher energy prices caused by emission taxes.  A small increase in 
Coal production and substitution between labour and the energy-capital composite are 
the reasons of reduced outputs in Gas and Biomass which are also very small in 
absolute terms compared to output of Coal. 
 
The largest effect of emission taxation on output across all sectors is in Gas sector, 
where it can amount in some increase to more than 100%.  We should note that this 
sector depends completely on the international market, because 96% of supply is 
imported. Thus, a huge relative increase of output is a consequence of a very small 
share (below 0.1%) of this sector in aggregate output.  
 
Changes in GDP and Other Macroeconomic Measures 
 
Table 7 summarises the changes in main macroeconomic indicators.   We draw the 
reader’s attention to the following: 
a. The effect on GDP is negative in all cases, but quite small, ranging from -0.5% 
(B17) to 2.5% (B30M and C30).  The lower rate of carbon tax alone reduces GDP 
by 0.5% and almost doubling the rate of carbon tax causes a 1% fall in GDP.  
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Local pollution taxes reduce GDP by 1.4% and combining the two taxes reduces 
GDP by 2 -2.5%.  Recycling tax revenues via payroll tax cuts makes the reduction 
about 0.5% less than in the case of no recycling or lump-sum recycling. 
b. Both imports and exports are affected by taxation policies slightly and by the 
same magnitude, so the trade balance is little affected by the tax changes.  
c. Private consumption is reduced more significantly and the range of reduction is 
wide across the scenarios: from a low of 1.5% (B17) to a high of 5.9% (C30).   A 
carbon tax by itself reduced consumption the least (1.5 to 2.5%) and a local 
pollution tax reduces it by 3.5%.  Taking the two taxes together we get the large 
reduction of 5.9%, when there is no revenue recycling.  With lump sum 
recycling the reduction is 3.8% and with recycling via a payroll tax it is 2.3%. 
d. As expected, public consumption increases when taxes are collected and not 
recycled.  When the taxes are recycled, however, the level of public 
consumption falls by 2.4 to 2.6%. 
e. The effects on unemployment are varied and important.  The high local 
pollution taxes would increase unemployment by 7.9% (note this is an increase 
on a per cent figure).  The carbon taxes by themselves, however, result in a 
small decline in the unemployment rate, as the tax shifts demand away from 
the more energy intensive goods to the more labour intensive ones.  The two 
taxes taken together, however, cause an increase in unemployment of 10.2% 
(C30, when the revenues are not recycled) or 13.3% (C30-lsp, when the 
revenues are recycled through a lump sum tax). Imposing carbon tax and air 
emission charges simultaneously (Scenario C30), generates about 31 billion CZK 
of additional revenue (or, an equivalent of 1.0% of GDP), which can be either 
used to cut social security contributions paid by employee by 19% (from 35 to 
28 percent points of gross wage), or to provide a lump-sum payment to 
households (that is an equivalent of 2.1% of household consumption).  On the 
other had if the revenues from the joint taxes are recycled through lower social 
security quasi-taxes (C30-ssc), there is a fall in unemployment of 3.1%. 
f. Finally we consider the effects on welfare.  Conventionally welfare is measured 
in terms of the equivalent variation gains or losses, which take account of 
consumption of the goods and services in the input-output system.  If we do 
that we have losses given in the row “Welfare (EV))”, ranging from 22.2 billion 
CZK (0.7% of benchmark GDP) to 85.5 billion CZK (2.9% of benchmark GDP).  
Such a measure, however, fails to take account of the environmental benefits 
generated by the reductions in emissions.  If these reductions are valued at 
their marginal damages (see Section III) we get benefits   ranging from 43.8 
billion (B17) to around 132 billion CZK (across the three C Scenarios).  These 
benefits are greater than the losses in EV in all cases.  Hence all the policies 
have an environmental benefit that exceeds the EV loss, but the greatest is in 
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the case of Scenario C30-ssc (when both local and carbon taxes are imposed 
and the revenues recycled through lower labour cost). 
 
Table 7: Macroeconomic indicators [% BAU] 
  A B17 B30 B30M C30 C30-lsp C30-ssc 
        
GDP -1.4 -0.5 -1.0 -1.2 -2.5 -2.5 -2.0 
GDP [bln. CZK] -42 -16 -30 -35 -75 -75 -58 
Price Index 1.6 0.5 0.8 0.9 2.4 2.5 2.6 
Output -0.2 -0.1 -0.2 -0.3 -0.6 -0.6 0.3 
Export 1.2 0.0 -0.1 0.0 1.1 1.4 2.9 
Import 1.2 0.0 -0.1 0.0 1.1 1.4 3.0 
Private Consumption -3.5 -1.5 -2.5 -3.2 -5.9 -3.8 -2.3 
Public Consumption 0.1 2.3 3.1 4.3 2.0 0 -0 
Corporate income Tax -7.9 -2.7 -4.2 -5.1 -11.2 -10.9 -8.6 
Excise Tax -9.1 -2.4 -3.6 -5.6 -11.9 -11.4 -10.6 
Personal income tax -7.1 -1.8 -3.0 -3.8 -9.9 -31.8 -5.9 
Social security contributions -1.5 0.5 0.5 0.4 -1.9 -2.5 -13.1 
Value added tax -3.9 -1.7 -2.7 -3.4 -6.4 -4.6 -3.2 
          
Demand for labour -0.7 0.2 0.2 0.2 -0.9 -1.2 0.3 
Labour cost -0.8 0.3 0.3 0.2 -1.1 -1.4 -4.3 
Unemployment  7.9 -2.5 -2.5 -2.1 10.2 13.3 -3.1 
          
Welfare (EV) [bln. CZK] -50.8 -22.2 -36.3 -46.3 -85.5 -55.6 -34.0 
Environmental benefits [bln. CZK] 119.0 43.8 57.0 60.1 132.7 132.0 131.5 
Total welfare [bln. CZK] 68.2 21.6 20.7 13.9 47.2 76.3 97.4 
 
5.4. Dividends of the policy 
We now return to the different kinds of dividends defined in Ligthart and van der Ploeg 
(1999) (see Figure 3).  Based on the results in Table 7, we conclude the employment 
double dividend is only present in the case of carbon taxes alone (B17, B30, B30M) or 
in the case of carbon tax and environmental charges with recycling of revenues via 
lower labour cost (C30-ssc).  The social double dividend is reaped under all scenarios 
except the two that recycle revenues, where the equal yield constraint is applied.  The 
triple dividend is only obtained in the case when the carbon taxes are imposed by 
themselves (scenarios B).  Ligthart and van der Ploeg (1999) refer also to a “blue 
dividend” when conventional economic welfare is raised.  In no case we get this; we 
would argue, however, that the failure to get a blue dividend is not such a matter of 
concern. For example Heerden at al. (2006) found a triple dividend when 
environmental taxes are recycled through a reduction in food prices. 
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6. Conclusions 
 
This paper has analyzed the impacts of local emissions charges based on marginal 
damages and charges on CO2 for a small open economy, namely the Czech Republic.  
Previous studies had estimated that CO2 taxes imposed at a European or even world-
wide level would reduce emissions of CO2 as well as associated local pollutants.  But 
there have been no known studies looking at the combination of emission charges plus 
CO2.   The examined emission charges were set equal to the estimated marginal 
damages and were much higher (more than two orders of magnitude) than existing 
taxes. 
 
The analysis was carried out using a static CGE model6, with endogenous 
unemployment and with a bottom-up abatement technologies module attached to it.   
The model considers carbon taxes alone and emissions charges alone, as well as cases 
where the both instruments were imposed simultaneously.   These taxes were 
examined in conjunction with different recycling options for the tax revenues. Taking 
account of the abatement technologies into the economic activity has enabled us to 
conduct more refined analysis compared to the existing literature.   
 
The results show that setting local emissions taxes alone equal to marginal damages 
would make major reductions in the taxed pollutants (NOx, SO2 and PM), as well as 
reducing emissions  of complementary pollutants such as VOCs.  These emission 
charges also result in major reductions in CO2 even though the GHG is not taxed.   
Conversely a tax on CO2 by itself reduces the local pollutants (though not as much as 
the emission charges), while making a reduction in CO2 that is in fact slightly smaller 
than that obtained from the emission charges.  When the local pollution charges and 
CO2 taxes are combined the effect on local emissions is less than the sum of the two 
sets of taxes but more than that of each of them individually.   These taxes also reduce 
energy demand from fossil fuel source (particularly coal) significantly. 
 
                                                          
6
 The model is calibrated to parameter based on the values in 2005, and thus answers the question, what 
would happen if a certain type of policy is implemented when the economy is in the situation as it was in 
2005. The static model allows us to examine the details of the Czech economy and enviromental 
technology situations. On the contrary a fully dynamic model would allow us to explicitly embed the 
capital accumulation and change in consumption and production behaviour.  However mentioned in 
Babiker et al. (2011), the fully dynamic model assumes the forward-looking of the agents, and some 
parts of the model have to be simplified. 
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In terms of the effects on the economic variables, the most serious is the impact on 
GDP.  The high levels of emission charges would reduce GDP by around 1.4%.  The 
range of CO2 taxes would make smaller reductions in GDP (0.5% to 1.2%) but the 
combined taxes could have an impact as large as 2.5%.  Moreover some sectors (i.e. 
those that are highly dependent on fossil fuels) would be much more significantly 
impacted.  Notable among these are chemicals, coal and agriculture.  Thus any 
government contemplating such a tax shift would have to prepare a phase in period 
that allowed these sectors to adjust to the higher taxes, with possible lower rates 
during a transition period.   
 
Other significant impacts are in terms of unemployment.  The emission charges would 
raise unemployment if they were implemented without reduction of payroll taxes. 
Unemployment decreases either when carbon tax is implemented alone or when labor 
costs are decreased. When the labor cost decrease, labor demand naturally increases. 
On the other hand, when only carbon tax is implemented, the increase in output in the 
labor intensive sector actually increases, and thus, consequently labor demand, as a 
whole, increases. However, once the emission charges are combined with carbon 
taxation, most of the sectors decrease their output and overall labor demand 
decreases. Most importantly, there are also environmental benefits that, when 
measured in money terms using separable welfare function are greater than the 
economic losses.    These gains are greatest when both taxes are imposed with the 
revenues recycling through a reduction in payroll taxes. 
 
While these conclusions are important, we feel that further work is needed in several 
areas.  Market for emission permits should be added, labor-leisure choice is important 
to consider, and dynamic modeling will allow us to provide a long-term analysis.  
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